On the Ternary Relation and Conditionality

Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):595 - 612 (2012)
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Abstract

One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing a general conception of conditionality that may unify the three given conceptions

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Author Profiles

Edwin Mares
Victoria University of Wellington
Graham Priest
CUNY Graduate Center
Greg Restall
University of Melbourne
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Citations of this work

Mathematical Explanation by Law.Sam Baron - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):683-717.
Notes on Stratified Semantics.Shay Allen Logan - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (4):749-786.

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An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is.Graham Priest - 2008 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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