Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (3):595 - 612 (2012)

Authors
Jc Beall
University of Notre Dame
Abstract
One of the most dominant approaches to semantics for relevant (and many paraconsistent) logics is the Routley-Meyer semantics involving a ternary relation on points. To some (many?), this ternary relation has seemed like a technical trick devoid of an intuitively appealing philosophical story that connects it up with conditionality in general. In this paper, we respond to this worry by providing three different philosophical accounts of the ternary relation that correspond to three conceptions of conditionality. We close by briefly discussing a general conception of conditionality that may unify the three given conceptions
Keywords Ternary relation  Ternary-relation semantics  Possible worlds  Situations  Modal logics  Paraconsistent logics  Relevant logics  Routley–Meyer semantics  Conditionals  Conditionality  Relative relative possibility
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-011-9191-5
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Kellogg Lewis - 1973 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Blackwell.
Situations and Attitudes.Jon Barwise & John Perry - 1981 - Journal of Philosophy 78 (11):668-691.
Modal Logic.Patrick Blackburn, Maarten de Rijke & Yde Venema - 2002 - Cambridge University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Mathematical Explanation by Law.Sam Baron - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):683-717.
Fusion and Confusion.Graham Priest - 2015 - Topoi 34 (1):55-61.

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