What Comes First in Dynamic Semantics: A Critical Review of Linguistic Theories of Presupposition and a Dynamic Alternative

Center for the Study of Language and Information Publications (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Russell and Strawson sparked a well known debate on the subject of Linguistic Presupposition inspiring many linguists and philosophers to follow suit, including Frege, whose work initiated the modern study in this area. Beaver begins with the most comprehensive overview and critical discussion of this burgeoning field published to date. He then goes on to motivate and develop his own account based on a Dynamic Semantics. This account is a recent line of theoretical work in which the Tarskian emphasis on truth conditions is questioned. The central plank of the theory of meaning is a formal account of the change in information effected by use of language on hearers or readers. The proposal thus consolidates ideas of Stalnaker, Karttunen and Heim, all of whom had suggested that such an account was needed. At the same time it provides a new impulse and motivation to Dynamic Semantics itself.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 89,560

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-02-13

Downloads
4 (#1,411,342)

6 months
3 (#431,291)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

David Beaver
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Epistemic Modals.Seth Yalcin - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):983-1026.
Bounded Modality.Matthew Mandelkern - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (1):1-61.
Dynamics of Epistemic Modality.Malte Willer - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):45-92.
Epistemology Formalized.Sarah Moss - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (1):1-43.

View all 165 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references