Quality and Concept

Oxford University Press (1982)
Authors
George Bealer
Yale University
Abstract
This study provides a unified theory of properties, relations, and propositions (PRPs). Two conceptions of PRPs have emerged in the history of philosophy. The author explores both of these traditional conceptions and shows how they can be captured by a single theory.
Keywords Philosophy
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Call number B945.B3743.Q34 1982
ISBN(s) 0198244282  
DOI 10.2307/2184837
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Deep Platonism.Chad Carmichael - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):307-328.
Know-How and Concept Possession.Bengson John & Moffett Marc - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (1):31 - 57.
Universals.Chad Carmichael - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):373-389.

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