Self-consciousness

Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117 (1997)
Abstract
Self-consciousness constitutes an insurmountable obstacle to functionalism. Either the standard functional definitions of mental relations wrongly require the contents of self-consciousness to be propositions involving “realizations” rather than mental properties and relations themselves. Or else these definitions are circular. The only way to save functional definitions is to expunge the standard functionalist requirement that mental properties be second-order and to accept that they are first-order. But even the resulting “ideological” functionalism, which aims only at conceptual clarification, fails unless it incorporates the thesis that the mental properties are fully “natural” universals. Accordingly, mental properties are sui generis: first-order, nonphysical, natural universals.
Keywords Cogito  Functionalism  Materialism  Mental Property  Metaphysics  Reductionism  Self-consciousness  Descartes  Shoemaker, S  Tarski
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DOI 10.2307/2998342
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Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
Is Property Dualism Better Off Than Substance Dualism?William G. Lycan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):533-542.
Against A Posteriori Functionalism.Marc Moffett - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (1):83-106.
European Functionalism.Sven Rosenkranz - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):229 - 249.

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