Sober on intelligent design theory and the intelligent designer

Faith and Philosophy 25 (4):432-442 (2008)
Abstract
Intelligent design theorists claim that their theory is neutral as to the identity of the intelligent designer, even with respect to whether it is a natural or a supernatural agent. In a recent issue of Faith and Philosophy, Elliott Sober has argued that in fact the theory is not neutral on this issue, and that it entails theexistence of a supernatural designer. I examine Sober’s argument and identify several hurdles it must overcome
Keywords Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy and Religion
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ISBN(s) 0739-7046
DOI 10.5840/faithphil200825444
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Intelligent Design.William Hasker - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):586-597.

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How Not to Detect Design. [REVIEW]Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):472 - 488.
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How Not to Detect Design. [REVIEW]Branden Fitelson - 1999 - Philosophy of Science 66 (3):472 - 488.
Intelligent Design and Probability Reasoning.Elliott Sober - 2002 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 52 (2):65-80.
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