Review of Metaphysics 52 (3):664-666 (1999)

Authors
Brian Beakley
Eastern Illinois University
Abstract
Building on earlier papers on the same theme, Chalmers argues here for a dualism which is epiphenomenalist, yet naturalistic. After establishing the elements of his position, Chalmers explores numerous applications, including arguments against missing and inverted qualia; the congeniality of his view to panpsychism, functionalism, and artificial intelligence, and even the proper interpretation of quantum physics.
Keywords Catholic Tradition  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0034-6632
DOI revmetaph199952311
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,079
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Mental Concepts as Natural Kind Concepts.Diana I. Pérez - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (Supplement):201-225.
Critical Study: Joseph Levine's Purple Haze.William G. Lycan - 2005 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):448 – 463.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Is the Mind Conscious, Functional, or Both?Max Velmans - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4):629-630.
Consciousness and the Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly 51 (July):227-251.
Conscious Experience Versus Conscious Thought.Peter Carruthers - 2005 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Consciousness and Self-Reference. MIT Press.
Conscious Thinking: Language or Elimination?Peter Carruthers - 1998 - Mind and Language 13 (4):457-476.
Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality.David J. Chalmers - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.
Why Conscious Free Will Both is and Isn't an Illusion.Max Velmans - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):677.
The Mind’s Best Trick: How We Experience Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):65-69.
Conscious and Unconscious States.Aaron Ben-Ze'ev - 1988 - Philosophical Studies (Dublin) 32:44-62.
How Could Conscious Experiences Affect Brains?Max Velmans - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):3-29.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2012-03-18

Total views
21 ( #534,405 of 2,506,032 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #416,828 of 2,506,032 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes