The incoherence of empiricism

Authors
George Bealer
Yale University
Abstract
Radical empiricism is the view that a person's experiences (sensory and introspective), or a person's observations, constitute the person's evidence. This view leads to epistemic self-defeat. There are three arguments, concerning respectively: (1) epistemic starting points; (2) epistemic norms; (3) terms of epistemic appraisal. The source of self-defeat is traced to the fact that empiricism does not count a priori intuition as evidence (where a priori intuition is not a form of belief but rather a form of seeming, specifically intellectual as opposed to sensory). Moderate rationalism, by contrast, avoids self-defeat.
Keywords Epistemology of Intuition
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DOI 10.1093/aristoteliansupp/66.1.99
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The Intellectual Given.John Bengson - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):707-760.
What Intuitions Are Like.Elijah Chudnoff - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers.John Bengson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.
Logical Non‐Cognitivism.Crispin Wright - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):425-450.

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