The Liar Paradox

In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. CSLI Publications (2010)

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Abstract
The first sentence in this essay is a lie. There is something odd about saying so, as has been known since ancient times. To see why, remember that all lies are untrue. Is the first sentence true? If it is, then it is a lie, and so it is not true. Conversely, suppose that it is not true. As we (viz., the authors) have said it, presumably with the intention of you believing it when it is not true, it is a lie. But then it is true!
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The Self-Referential Aspect of Consciousness.Cosmin Visan - 2017 - Journal of Consciousness Exploration & Research 8 (11):864-880.
On Mixed Inferences and Pluralism About Truth Predicates.J. C. Beall - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (200):380-382.
Circularity in Ethotic Structures.Katarzyna Budzynska - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3185-3207.
Truth, Predication and a Family of Contingent Paradoxes.Francesco Orilia & Gregory Landini - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):113-136.

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