The self-consciousness argument: Why Tooley's criticisms fail

Philosophical Studies 105 (3):281-307 (2001)
Abstract
Ontological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can be defined wholly in terms of the general pattern of interaction of ontologically prior realizations. Ideological functionalism's defining tenet is that mental properties can only be defined nonreductively, in terms of the general pattern of their interaction with one another. My Self-consciousness Argument establishes: ontological functionalism is mistaken because its proposed definitions wrongly admit realizations into the contents of self-consciousness; ideological functionalism is the only viable alternative for functionalists. Michael Tooley's critique misses the target: he offers no criticism of - except for an incidental, and incorrect, attack on certain self-intimation principles - and, since he himself proposes a certain form of nonreductive definition, he tacitly accepts. Finally, as with all other nonreductive definitions, Tooley's proposal can be shown to undermine functionalism's ultimate goal: its celebrated materialist solution to the Mind-Body Problem. The explanation of these points will require a discussion of: Frege-Russell disagreements regarding intensional contexts; the relationship between self-consciousness and the traditional doctrine of acquaintance; the role of self-intimation principles in functionalist psychology; and the Kripke-Lewis controversy over the nature of theoretical terms.
Keywords Functionalism  Intensionality  Metaphysics  Self-consciousness  Theoretical Term  Frege  Kripke, S  Lewis, D  Russell  Shoemaker, S  Tooley, M
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2004
DOI 10.1023/A:1010358801138
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Functionalism and Logical Analysis.Paul M. Livingston - 2005 - In David Woodruff Smith & Amie L. Thomasson (eds.), Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 19.
Self-Consciousness.George Bealer - 1997 - Philosophical Review 106 (1):69-117.
Some Varieties of Functionalism.Sydney Shoemaker - 1981 - Philosophical Topics 12 (1):93-119.
Functionalism and Self-Consciousness.Mark McCullagh - 2000 - Mind and Language 15 (5):481-499.
Consciousness, Neural Functionalism, Real Subjectivity.Ted Honderich - 1995 - American Philosophical Quarterly 32 (4):369-381.
Role Functionalism and Epiphenomenalism.Dwayne Moore - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):511-525.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
196 ( #26,158 of 2,236,877 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #48,141 of 2,236,877 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature