In Robert C. Koons & George Bealer (eds.), The Waning of Materialism: New Essays. Oxford University Press (2010)

Authors
George Bealer
Yale University
Abstract
In this chapter I argue that there is such a barrier created by self-conscious intentional states—conscious intentional states that are about one’s own conscious intentional states. As we will see, however, this result is entirely compatible with a scientific theory of mind, and, in fact, there is an elegant non-reductive framework in which just such a theory may be pursued.
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