Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (12):3-25 (2005)

Authors
Michael Beaton
University of the Basque Country
Abstract
The explicit aim of Daniel Dennett’s new paper ‘What RoboMary Knows’ is to show that Mary will necessarily be able to come to know what it is like to see in colour, if she fully understands all the physical facts about colour vision. I believe we can establish that Dennett’s line of reasoning is flawed, but the flaw is not as simple as an equivocation on ‘knows’. Rather, it goes to the heart of functionalism and hinges on whether or not Dennett is correct to claim that there is ‘no fact of the matter’ about what subjective experience consists in.
Keywords Brain  Cognitive Science  Consciousness  Human  Robot  Science  Churchland, Paul M  Dennett, Daniel  Lewis, David
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
The Bounds of Cognition.Frederick Adams & Kenneth Aizawa - 2008 - Malden, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Consciousness Explained.William G. Lycan - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (3):424.
Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.

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Citations of this work BETA

Phenomenal Knowledge Without Experience.Torin Alter - 2008 - In Edmond Wright (ed.), The case for qualia. MIT Press. pp. 247.
Can Mary's Qualia Be Epiphenomenal?Daniel Lim & Wang Hao - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):503-512.

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