Am I My Brother's Keeper? On Personal Identity and Responsibility

Authors
Simon Beck
University of the Western Cape
Abstract
The psychological continuity theory of personal identity has recently been accused of not meeting what is claimed to be a fundamental requirement on theories of identity - to explain personal moral responsibility. Although they often have much to say about responsibility, the charge is that they cannot say enough. I set out the background to the charge with a short discussion of Locke and the requirement to explain responsibility, then illustrate the accusation facing the theory with details from Marya Schechtman. I aim some questions at the challengers’ reading of Locke, leading to an argument that the psychological continuity theory can say all that it needs to say about responsibility, and so is not in any grave predicament, at least not with regard to this particular charge.
Keywords Personal Identity  Personal Identity and Morality  Marya Schechtman  John Locke  Psychological Continuity Theory
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Reprint years 2014
DOI 10.1080/02580136.2013.810410
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Locke on Personal Identity.Shelley Weinberg - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (6):398-407.
The Constitution of Selves.Christopher Williams & Marya Schechtman - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):641.
The Misunderstandings of the Self-Understanding View.Simon Beck - 2013 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 20 (1):33-42.
Personal Identity and the Past.Marya Schechtman - 2005 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 12 (1):9-22.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Extreme Claim, Psychological Continuity and the Person Life View.Simon Beck - 2015 - South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):314-322.

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