Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (7):20-30 (2005)
In the present paper we present a short review of some recent neuro- physiological and neuropsychological findings which suggest that self-generated actions and actions of others are mapped on the same neural substratum. Since this substratum is neutral with respect to the agent, correctly attributing an action to its proper author requires the co-activation of areas specific to the self and the other. A conceptual analysis of the empirical data will lead us to conclude that from a neurobiological point of view the problem is not 'how is it possible to share the intentions of others', but rather 'how one can distinguish one's own action/intention from those of other people'.
|Keywords||Intentionality Metaphysics Mind Other Self Subjectivism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism.Peter W. Ross - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):42-58.
What Makes Human Cognition Unique? From Individual to Shared to Collective Intentionality.Michael Tomasello & Hannes Rakoczy - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (2):121-147.
The Folk Concept of Intentionality.Joshua Knobe & Bertram Malle - 1997 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 33:101-121.
Nonseparability of Shared Intentionality.Mr Christian Flender, Dr Kirsty Kitto & Prof Peter Bruza - unknown
What is a Neural Correlate of Consciousness?David J. Chalmers - 2000 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Neural Correlates of Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 17--39.
Wittgenstein Running: Neural Mechanisms of Collective Intentionality and We-Mode.Cristina Becchio & Cesare Bertone - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):123-133.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads65 ( #79,588 of 2,158,278 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #355,837 of 2,158,278 )
How can I increase my downloads?