Philosophia 37 (2):245-260 (2009)
There’s something deeply right in the idea that knowledge requires an ability to discriminate truth from falsity. Failing to incorporate some version of the discrimination requirement into one’s epistemology generates cases of putative knowledge that are at best problematic. On the other hand, many theories that include a discrimination requirement thereby appear to entail violations of closure. This prima facie tension is resolved nicely in Jonathan Schaffer’s contrastivism, which I describe herein. The contrastivist take on relevant alternatives is implausible, however, and this then threatens to undermine contrastivism’s anti-skeptical results.
|Keywords||Contrastivism Discrimination Epistemic luck Relevant alternatives Epistemology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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