South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):244-255 (2011)

Simon Beck
University of the Western Cape
The view that an account of personal identity can be provided in terms of psychological continuity has come under fire from an interesting new angle in recent years. Critics from a variety of rival positions have argued that it cannot adequately explain what makes psychological states co-personal (i.e. the states of a single person). The suggestion is that there will inevitably be examples of states that it wrongly ascribes using only the causal connections available to it. In this paper, I describe three distinct attacks on the psychological continuity theory along these lines. While I acknowledge that a number of interesting issues arise, I argue that the theory can withstand all three attacks.
Keywords Personal identity  Psychological continuity theory
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DOI 10.4314/sajpem.v30i2.67788
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The Unimportance of Identity.Derek Parfit - 1995 - In H. Harris (ed.), Identity. Oxford University Press. pp. 13-45.
The Identity of the Self.Geoffrey C. Madell - 1981 - Edinburgh University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Transplant Thought-Experiments: Two Costly Mistakes in Discounting Them.Simon Beck - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):189-199.
Transplanting Brains?Nils-Frederic Wagner - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):18-27.
Am I My Brother's Keeper? On Personal Identity and Responsibility.Simon Beck - 2013 - South African Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):1-9.

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