Epistemic luck and the generality problem

Philosophical Studies 139 (3):353 - 366 (2008)
Epistemic luck has been the focus of much discussion recently. Perhaps the most general knowledge-precluding type is veritic luck, where a belief is true but might easily have been false. Veritic luck has two sources, and so eliminating it requires two distinct conditions for a theory of knowledge. I argue that, when one sets out those conditions properly, a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism emerges.
Keywords Reliabilism  Generality problem  Epistemic luck  Veritic luck  Externalism  Theory of knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
Alvin Goldman (1979). ``What is Justified Belief?". In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. pp. 1-25.
Ernest Sosa (1991). Knowledge in Perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Alvin Goldman (1976). Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 73 (November):771-791.

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