Dialectica 60 (1):79-84 (2006)

Authors
Kelly Becker
University of New Mexico
Abstract
Jonathan Vogel has recently argued that counterfactual reliabilism cannot account for higher‐level knowledge that one's belief is true, or not false. His particular argument for this claim is straightforward and valid. Interestingly, there is a parallel argument, based on an alternative but plausible reinterpretation of the main premise in Vogel's argument, which squares CR with higher‐level knowledge both that one's belief is true and that one's belief is not false. I argue that, while Vogel's argument reveals the incompatibility of CR and knowledge of certain higher‐level propositions, it does not establish the general claim that CR is incompatible with knowledge that any of one's beliefs is true, or not false.
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DOI 10.1111/dltc.2006.60.issue-1
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References found in this work BETA

Reliabilism Leveled.Jonathan Vogel - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (11):602.

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Citations of this work BETA

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