Kant's theory of definition

Philosophical Review 65 (2):179-191 (1956)
In the modern discussions about possibility of synthetic a priori propositions, the theory of definition has a fundamental importance, because the most definition’s theories hold that analytic judgments are involved by explicit definition . However, for Kant –first author who pointed out the distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions–many analytic judgments are made by analysis of concepts which need not first be established by definition. Moreover, for him not all a priori knowledge is analytic. The statement that not all analytic judgment is derived from definition and possibility of synthetic a priori knowledge, indicates Kant didn’t believe, contrary to modern theories about analytic judgment, the definition is an essential ground of knowledge
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.2307/2182830
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,765
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
A Peculiar Intuition: Kant's Conceptualist Account of Perception.Nathan Bauer - 2012 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (3):215-237.
Busting a Myth About Leśniewski and Definitions.Rafal Urbaniak & K. Severi Hämäri - 2012 - History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (2):159 - 189.
Definitions of Kant's Categories.Tyke Nunez - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (5-6):631-657.

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index

Total downloads
69 ( #83,721 of 2,214,617 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #108,474 of 2,214,617 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature