Margins for error and sensitivity: What Nozick might have said [Book Review]

Acta Analytica 24 (1):17-31 (2009)
Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms
Keywords Anti-luminosity  Externalism  Internalism  Nozick  Sensitivity  Williamson
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-008-0042-0
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References found in this work BETA
Keith DeRose (1995). Solving the Skeptical Problem. Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

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Citations of this work BETA
Kevin Wallbridge (2016). Sensitivity and Higher‐Order Knowledge. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):n/a-n/a.
Christoph Kelp (2014). Epistemology Extended. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):230-252.

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