Margins for error and sensitivity: What Nozick might have said [Book Review]

Acta Analytica 24 (1):17-31 (2009)
Abstract
Timothy Williamson has provided damaging counterexamples to Robert Nozick’s sensitivity principle. The examples are based on Williamson’s anti-luminosity arguments, and they show how knowledge requires a margin for error that appears to be incompatible with sensitivity. I explain how Nozick can rescue sensitivity from Williamson’s counterexamples by appeal to a specific conception of the methods by which an agent forms a belief. I also defend the proposed conception of methods against Williamson’s criticisms
Keywords Anti-luminosity  Externalism  Internalism  Nozick  Sensitivity  Williamson
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-008-0042-0
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Harvard University Press.
Reason, Truth, and History.Hilary Putnam - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
Solving the Skeptical Problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.

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Citations of this work BETA
Sensitivity and Higher-Order Knowledge.Kevin Wallbridge - forthcoming - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Epistemology Extended.Christoph Kelp - 2014 - Philosophical Issues 24 (1):230-252.
Taking Things for Granted: Comments on Harman and Sherman.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):141-147.

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