Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):319-334 (2018)

Authors
Jacob Beck
York University
Abstract
Philosophy, scientific psychology, and common sense all distinguish perception from cognition. While there is little agreement about how the perception–cognition boundary ought to be drawn, one prominent idea is that perceptual states are dependent on a stimulus, or stimulus-dependent, in a way that cognitive states are not. This paper seeks to develop this idea in a way that can accommodate two apparent counterexamples: hallucinations, which are prima facie perceptual yet stimulus-independent; and demonstrative thoughts, which are prima facie cognitive yet stimulus-dependent. The payoff is not only a specific proposal for marking the perception–cognition boundary, but also a deeper understanding of the natures of hallucination and demonstrative thought.
Keywords perception  cognition  stimulus-dependence  stimulus-independence  hallucination  demonstrative thought
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Reprint years 2017, 2018
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DOI 10.1080/00048402.2017.1329329
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References found in this work BETA

Origins of Objectivity.Tyler Burge - 2010 - Oxford University Press.
The Origin of Concepts.Susan Carey - 2009 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Explaining Imagination.Peter Langland-Hassan - 2020 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Perceptual Pluralism.Jake Quilty‐Dunn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):807-838.
The Epistemic Role of Core Cognition.Zoe Jenkin - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):251-298.

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