Naturalismus und Freiheit. Replik auf die Kommentare von Geert Keil, Jasper Liptow und Gerson Reuter

Ansgar Beckermann
Bielefeld University
This article is a reply to the comments on my book Gehirn, Ich, Freiheit by Geert Keil, Jasper Liptow and Gerson Reuter. My main concern is to show that we humans may be free and responsible even if we are thoroughly natural beings. But what exactly is a thoroughly natural being? In section 1, I try to answer this question by elaborating in more detail what, in my view, naturalism amounts to. In sections 2 and 5, I address the question what it may mean for natural beings to be able to act or decide otherwise. In section 3, I distinguish two versions of libertarianism which I call,standard‘ and,non-standard libertarianism‘; furthermore I explain some of the main problems non-standard libertarians are confronted with. Section 4 is devoted to Geert Keil’s version of non-standard libertarianism. My main objection to this theory is that Keil has so far given no answer to the questions why a process of deliberation ends when it ends and what it may mean that a person is able to continue deliberating.
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