Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-17 (1992)

Authors
Simon Beck
University of the Western Cape
Abstract
Thought-experiments in which one person divides into two have been important in the literature on personal identity. I consider three influential arguments which aim to undermine the force of these thought-experiments – arguments from David Wiggins, Patricia Kitcher and Kathleen Wilkes. I argue that all three fail, leaving us to face the consequences of splitting, whatever those may be.
Keywords personal identity  fission  thought-experiments  thought experiments  Kathleen Wilkes  David Wiggins  Patricia Kitcher
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ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.1992.tb00625.x
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Mind, Language, and Reality.Hilary Putnam - 1975 - Cambridge University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.

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Citations of this work BETA

Back to the Self and the Future.S. Beck - 1998 - South African Journal of Philosophy 17 (3):211-225.

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