Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-17 (1992)

Simon Beck
University of the Western Cape
Thought-experiments in which one person divides into two have been important in the literature on personal identity. I consider three influential arguments which aim to undermine the force of these thought-experiments – arguments from David Wiggins, Patricia Kitcher and Kathleen Wilkes. I argue that all three fail, leaving us to face the consequences of splitting, whatever those may be.
Keywords personal identity  thought-experiments  thought experiments  fission  Kathleen Wilkes  David Wiggins
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI southernjphil199230114
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 50,342
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Should We Tolerate People Who Split?Simon Beck - 1992 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):1-17.
Was Jekyll Hyde?Eric T. Olson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):328 - 348.
Dennett on the Split-Brain.Roland Puccetti - 1993 - Psycoloquy 4 (52).
The Switch Model of Split-Brain Consciousness.Elizabeth Schechter - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (2):203 - 226.
The Unity of Consciousness and the Split-Brain Syndrome.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (6):277-300.
Split Hairs and Split Movements.Ron Lindsay - 2008 - Free Inquiry 29:16-17.
Split Brains.Karol Polcyn - 2011 - Filozofia Nauki 19 (3).
Do We Tolerate Inconsistencies?Katalin G. Havas - 1993 - Dialectica 47 (1):27-35.


Added to PP index

Total views
20 ( #482,998 of 2,326,062 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #646,834 of 2,326,062 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes