Philosophical Papers 35 (1):29-54 (2006)

Authors
Simon Beck
University of the Western Cape
Abstract
Philosophers have traditionally used thought-experiments in their endeavours to find a satisfactory account of the self and personal identity. Yet there are considerations from empirical psychology as well as related ones from philosophy itself that appear to completely undermine the method of thought-experiment. This paper focuses on both sets of considerations and attempts a defence of the method.
Keywords Metaphysics  Personal Identity  Psychology  Thought Experiment
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DOI 10.1080/05568640609485171
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Transplant Thought-Experiments: Two Costly Mistakes in Discounting Them.Simon Beck - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):189-199.
Reconsidering a Transplant: A Response to Wagner.Simon Beck - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):132-140.
Madness as Method: On Locke’s Thought Experiments About Personal Identity.Kathryn Tabb - 2018 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 26 (5):871-889.

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