These bizarre fictions: Thought-experiments, our psychology and our selves

Philosophical Papers 35 (1):29-54 (2006)
Philosophers have traditionally used thought-experiments in their endeavours to find a satisfactory account of the self and personal identity. Yet there are considerations from empirical psychology as well as related ones from philosophy itself that appear to completely undermine the method of thought-experiment. This paper focuses on both sets of considerations and attempts a defence of the method.
Keywords Metaphysics  Personal Identity  Psychology  Thought Experiment
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DOI 10.1080/05568640609485171
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Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.

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Transplant Thought-Experiments: Two Costly Mistakes in Discounting Them.Simon Beck - 2014 - South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):189-199.

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