The essential nature of the method of the natural sciences: Response to A. T. Nuyen's "truth, method, and objectivity: Husserl and Gadamer on scientific method"

Philosophy of the Social Sciences 23 (1):73-76 (1993)

Joe Becker
University of Illinois, Chicago
Nuyen contrasts the natural sciences with the human sciences, contending that the latter has an objectivity that derives from its detachment and its generalization and abstraction from the particularity of individual objects and situations. In contrast the present paper offers a perspective which sees in the natural sciences an essential relation between knower and known similar to that attributed by Nuyen to the human sciences. Furthermore, it specifies the function of generalization in the natural sciences in terms of distinguishing between theory and data, even while working to bring them together. Examination of similarities and differences between the natural and the human sciences might ask whether the human sciences maintain a similar distinction by different methods. In that way we might more clearly understand whether interpretive and phenomenological methods are importantly similar to the method of the natural sciences, and whether they are differently scientific from the method of the natural sciences.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1177/004839319302300104
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 39,607
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth.Richard Rorty - 1991 - Cambridge University Press.
Hume and the Enactive Approach to Mind.Tom Froese - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):95-133.
Why Did Husserl Not Become the Galileo of the Science of Consciousness?Andrzej Klawiter - 2004 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 82 (1):253-271.
Karl Popper's Political Philosophy of Social Science.Geoff Stokes - 1997 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27 (1):56-79.
Naturalistic Hermeneutics.C. Mantzavinos - 2005 - Cambridge University Press.
Husserl, Weber, Freud, and the Method of the Human Sciences.Donald McIntosh - 1997 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 27 (3):328-353.
Truth, Method, and Objectivity Husserl and Gadamer on Scientific Method.A. T. Nuyen - 1990 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 20 (4):437-452.


Added to PP index

Total views
74 ( #98,939 of 2,325,340 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
4 ( #420,115 of 2,325,340 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature