The Sensitivity Principle in Epistemology

Cambridge University Press (2012)
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Abstract

The sensitivity principle is a compelling idea in epistemology and is typically characterized as a necessary condition for knowledge. This collection of thirteen new essays constitutes a state-of-the-art discussion of this important principle. Some of the essays build on and strengthen sensitivity-based accounts of knowledge and offer novel defences of those accounts. Others present original objections to sensitivity-based accounts and offer comprehensive analysis and discussion of sensitivity's virtues and problems. The resulting collection will stimulate new debate about the sensitivity principle and will be of great interest and value to scholars and advanced students of epistemology.

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Author Profiles

Kelly Becker
University of New Mexico
Tim Black
California State University, Northridge

Citations of this work

Fake Barns and False Dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.
Sensitivity and Higher-Order Knowledge.Kevin Wallbridge - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
Debunking Arguments From Insensitivity.Matthew Braddock - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):91-113.

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References found in this work

Safety, Content, Apriority, Self-Knowledge.David Manley - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (8):403-423.

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