South African Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):189-199 (2014)

Authors
Simon Beck
University of the Western Cape
Abstract
‘Transplant’ thought-experiments, in which the cerebrum is moved from one body to another, have featured in a number of recent discussions in the personal identity literature. Once taken as offering confirmation of some form of psychological continuity theory of identity, arguments from Marya Schechtman and Kathleen Wilkes have contended that this is not the case. Any such apparent support is due to a lack of detail in their description or a reliance on predictions that we are in no position to make. I argue that the case against them rests on two serious misunderstandings of the operation of thought-experiments, and that even if they do not ultimately support a psychological continuity theory, they do major damage to that theory’s opponents.
Keywords Psychological continuity theory  Person Life View  Marya Schechtman  Thought-experiments
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Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1080/02580136.2014.923685
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References found in this work BETA

The Self and the Future.Bernard Williams - 1970 - Philosophical Review 79 (2):161-180.
Personal Identity.Sydney Shoemaker & Richard Swinburne - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (3):184-185.

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Citations of this work BETA

Transplanting Brains?Nils-Frederic Wagner - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):18-27.
The Extreme Claim, Psychological Continuity and the Person Life View.Simon Beck - 2015 - South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (3):314-322.
Reconsidering a Transplant: A Response to Wagner.Simon Beck - 2016 - South African Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):132-140.
Brain Death: What We Are and When We Die.Lukas Meier - 2020 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrews

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

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