In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. pp. 113--130 (2009)
Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological explanation?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To analyze what is involved in these types of explanations, we consider the ways in which law-like representations of regularities and representations of mechanisms factor in psychological explanations. This consideration directs us to certain fundamental questions, e.g., "To what extent are laws necessary for psychological explanations?" and "What do psychologists have in mind when they appeal to mechanisms in explanation?" In answering such questions, it appears that laws do play important roles in psychological explanations, although most explanations in psychology appeal to accounts of mechanisms. Consequently, we provide a unifying account of what psychological explanation is.
|Keywords||explanation psychological explanation mechanistic explanation psychophysics information-processing psychology physiological psychology laws psychological laws functional analysis generalization|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Compositional Explanatory Relations and Mechanistic Reduction.Kari L. Theurer - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (3):287-307.
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