Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1027-1042 (2020)

Authors
Matthew Bedke
University of British Columbia
Abstract
Either 1. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as relevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters, or 2. the non-naturalist is in a state of mind that would treat as irrelevant information about the existence and patterns of non-natural properties and facts as they make up their mind about normative matters. The first state of mind is morally objectionable, for one should not change one’s normative beliefs to pander to the patterns of some non-natural realm. The second state of mind is irrational, for if you think you are aiming to represent non-natural properties correctly, you should be interested to know which actions share a non-natural property and which do not, and you should be prepared to change your mind accordingly.
Keywords moral non-naturalism  moral epistemology
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-018-01228-2
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References found in this work BETA

Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Thinking How to Live.Allan Gibbard - 2003 - Harvard University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Immoral Realism.Max Hayward - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):897-914.
Ethics and the Question of What to Do.Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
Is There a Good Moral Argument Against Moral Realism?Camil Golub - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):151-164.

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