Philosophical Studies 177 (9):2789-2813 (2020)
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Abstract |
According to noncognitivism, normative beliefs are just desire-like attitudes. While noncognitivists have devoted great effort to explaining the nature of normative belief, they have said little about all of the other attitudes we take towards normative matters. Many of us desire to do the right thing. We sometimes wonder whether our conduct is morally permissible; we hope that it is, and occasionally fear that it is not. This gives rise to what Schroeder calls the 'Many Attitudes Problem': the problem of developing a plausible noncognitivist account of the full range of attitudes that we take towards normative matters. This paper explores the problem and proposes a solution.
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Keywords | expressivism moral belief desire functional role psychology noncognitivism |
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DOI | 10.1007/s11098-019-01339-4 |
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References found in this work BETA
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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Citations of this work BETA
Interpretative Expressivism: A Theory of Normative Belief.James L. D. Brown - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):1-20.
How to Have Your Quasi-Cake and Quasi-Eat It Too.Sebastian Köhler - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (3):204-220.
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