Synthese 102 (1):139 - 164 (1995)

A variation of Bell's theorem that deals with the indeterministic case is formulated and proved within the logical framework of Lewis's theory of counterfactuals. The no-faster-than-light-influence condition is expressed in terms of Lewis would counterfactual conditionals. Objections to this procedure raised by certain philosophers of science are examined and answered. The theorem shows that the incompatibility between the predictions of quantum theory and the idea of no faster-than-light influence cannot be ascribed to any auxiliary or tacit assumption of either determinism or the related idea that outcomes of unperformed measurements are determinate within nature. In addition, the theorem provides an example of an application of Lewis's theory of counterfactuals in a rigorous scientific context.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063902
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References found in this work BETA

Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Blackwell.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Do Correlations Need to Be Explained?Arthur Fine - 1989 - In James T. Cushing & Ernan McMullin (eds.), Philosophical Consequences of Quantum Theory. University of Notre Dame Press. pp. 175--194.

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Citations of this work BETA

Time-Symmetrized Counterfactuals in Quantum Theory.Lev Vaidman - 1999 - Foundations of Physics 29 (5):755-765.
Why Classical Mechanics Cannot Accommodate Consciousness but Quantum Mechanics Can.Henry P. Stapp - 1995 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 2.
How to (Properly) Strengthen Bell's Theorem Using Counterfactuals.Tomasz Bigaj - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 41 (1):58-66.

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