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Downward causation and the autonomy of weak emergence
Principia 6 (1):5-50 (2002)
Abstract
Weak emergence has been offered as an explication of the ubiquitous notion of emergence used in complexity science (Bedau 1997). After outlining the problem of emergence and comparing weak emergence with the two other main objectivist approaches to emergence, this paper explains a version of weak emergence and illustrates it with cellular automata. Then it explains the sort of downward causation and explanatory autonomy involved in weak emergenceAuthor's Profile
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The Compatibility of Downward Causation and Emergence.Simone Gozzano - 2017 - In Michele Paolini Paoletti & Francesco Orilia (eds.), Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives on Downward Causation. New York: Routledge. pp. 296-312.
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Citations of this work
Metaphysical emergence: Weak and Strong.Jessica Wilson - 2013 - In Stephen Mumford & Matthew Tugby (eds.), Metaphysics and Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 251-306.
Ontological Emergence: How is That Possible? Towards a New Relational Ontology.Gil C. Santos - 2015 - Foundations of Science 20 (4):429-446.
The strong emergence of molecular structure.Vanessa A. Seifert - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):1-25.
Phenomenal Consciousness and Emergence: Eliminating the Explanatory Gap.Todd E. Feinberg & Jon Mallatt - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:537022.
References found in this work
The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory (2nd edition).David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Oxford University Press.
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