Downward causation and the autonomy of weak emergence

Principia 6 (1):5-50 (2002)
Weak emergence has been offered as an explication of the ubiquitous notion of emergence used in complexity science (Bedau 1997). After outlining the problem of emergence and comparing weak emergence with the two other main objectivist approaches to emergence, this paper explains a version of weak emergence and illustrates it with cellular automata. Then it explains the sort of downward causation and explanatory autonomy involved in weak emergence
Keywords Autonomy  Causation  Emergence  Explanation  Science
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