Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (4):427-440 (2010)

Abstract
Central to the freedom of association is the freedom to exclude. In fact, American constitutional law permits associations to discriminate on otherwise prohibited grounds, a principle of expressive discrimination or what I call "expressive exclusion." However, we lack a complete normative defense of it. Too often, expressive exclusion is justifi ed as a simple case of religious accommodation, or a simple case of freedom of association or speech—justifi cations that are defi cient. I argue that expressive exclusion is essential in creating genuine space for democratic dissent. It stands at the intersection of speech, association, and democracy
Keywords RELIGION   EXPRESSIVE DISCRIMINATION   FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION AND SPEECH   CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
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DOI 10.1163/174552410X535062
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