Brain and Cognition 34:5-27 (1997)

Authors
Mark Bedau
Reed College
Abstract
The dynamical patterns in mental phenomena have a characteristic suppleness&emdash;a looseness or softness that persistently resists precise formulation&emdash;which apparently underlies the frame problem of artificial intelligence. This suppleness also undermines contemporary philosophical functionalist attempts to define mental capacities. Living systems display an analogous form of supple dynamics. However, the supple dynamics of living systems have been captured in recent artificial life models, due to the emergent architecture of those models. This suggests that analogous emergent models might be able to explain supple dynamics of mental phenomena. These emergent models of the supple mind, if successful, would refashion the nature of contemporary functionalism in the philosophy of mind.
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Explanation in Dynamical Cognitive Science.Joel Walmsley - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (3):331-348.
Reductionism and the Irreducibility of Consciousness.John R. Searle - 1997 - In Owen J. Flanagan, Ned Block & Guven Guzeldere (eds.), The Nature of Consciousness. MIT Press.

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