Might All Normativity Be Queer?


Authors
Matthew Bedke
University of British Columbia
Abstract
Here I discuss the conceptual structure and core semantic commitments of reason-involving thought and discourse needed to underwrite the claim that ethical normativity is not uniquely queer. This deflates a primary source of ethical scepticism and it vindicates so-called partner in crime arguments. When it comes to queerness objections, all reason-implicating normative claims?including those concerning Humean reasons to pursue one's ends, and epistemic reasons to form true beliefs?stand or fall together
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802636445
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References found in this work BETA

.Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.) - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

If Nothing Matters.Guy Kahane - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):327-353.
Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - forthcoming - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press.

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