Might All Normativity Be Queer?

Abstract
Here I discuss the conceptual structure and core semantic commitments of reason-involving thought and discourse needed to underwrite the claim that ethical normativity is not uniquely queer. This deflates a primary source of ethical scepticism and it vindicates so-called partner in crime arguments. When it comes to queerness objections, all reason-implicating normative claims?including those concerning Humean reasons to pursue one's ends, and epistemic reasons to form true beliefs?stand or fall together
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802636445
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References found in this work BETA
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Moral Realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.

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Citations of this work BETA
Against Normative Naturalism.Matthew S. Bedke - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):111 - 129.
Pain for the Moral Error Theory? A New Companions-in-Guilt Argument.Guy Fletcher - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-9.
Moral Reasons, Epistemic Reasons, and Rationality.Alex Worsnip - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (263):341-361.

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