Philosophical Quarterly 65 (259):145-159 (2015)

Authors
Bob Beddor
National University of Singapore
Abstract
One attractive feature of process reliabilism is its reductive potential: it promises to explain justification in entirely non-epistemic terms. In this paper, I argue that the phenomenon of epistemic defeat poses a serious challenge for process reliabilism’s reductive ambitions. The standard process reliabilist analysis of defeat is the ‘Alternative Reliable Process Account’ (ARP). According to ARP, whether S’s belief is defeated depends on whether S has certain reliable processes available to her which, if they had been used, would have resulted in S not holding the belief in question. Unfortunately, ARP proves untenable. I show, by way of counterexample, that ARP fails to articulate either necessary or sufficient conditions on defeat. Process reliabilists must either provide an alternative reductive account of defeat or renounce their reductive aspirations.
Keywords reliabilism  defeat  reduction  reasons
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1093/pq/pqu075
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References found in this work BETA

Compassionate Phenomenal Conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.
Knowledge in a Social World.Alvin Goldman - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (1):185-190.
A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.
Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.

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Citations of this work BETA

What is Epistemic Blame?Jessica Brown - 2020 - Noûs 54 (2):389-407.
Defeatism Defeated.Max Baker-Hytch & Matthew A. Benton - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):40-66.
Higher-Order Defeat is Object-Independent.Joshua DiPaolo - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):248-269.
Reliabilism Without Epistemic Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-555.

View all 21 citations / Add more citations

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