Epistemic Closure in Folk Epistemology

In Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, Volume Two. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-70 (2018)

Authors
Jake Monaghan
University of New Orleans
James R. Beebe
State University of New York, Buffalo
Abstract
We report the results of four empirical studies designed to investigate the extent to which an epistemic closure principle for knowledge is reflected in folk epistemology. Previous work by Turri (2015a) suggested that our shared epistemic practices may only include a source-relative closure principle—one that applies to perceptual beliefs but not to inferential beliefs. We argue that the results of our studies provide reason for thinking that individuals are making a performance error when their knowledge attributions and denials conflict with the closure principle. When we used research materials that overcome what we think are difficulties with Turri’s original materials, we found that participants did not reject closure. Furthermore, when we presented Turri’s original materials to non-philosophers with expertise in deductive reasoning (viz., professional mathematicians), they endorsed closure for both perceptual and inferential beliefs. Our results suggest that an unrestricted closure principle—one that applies to all beliefs, regardless of their source—provides a better model of folk patterns of knowledge attribution than a source-relative closure principle.
Keywords epistemic closure  folk epistemology  experimental philosophy  experimental epistemology  knowledge  expertise
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and Lotteries.David Jehle - 2004 - Studia Logica 84 (1):161-163.
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