Non-Propositionalism and The Suppositional Rule

Erkenntnis:1-22 (2022)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It can often seem like the attitude we hold towards a conditional should be our attitude in the consequent on the supposition of the antecedent. Following by Williamson (Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals. Oxford University Press, 2020), we call this The suppositional rule (SR). The Adams-style non-propositional theories of indicatives upholds some key implications of SR, allowing, for instance, our credence in a conditional to be the probability of the consequent given the antecedent. Williamson (Suppose and Tell: The Semantics and Heuristics of Conditionals. Oxford University Press, 2020) has recently provided a series of inconsistency arguments against SR. He thereby intends to undermine non-propositional views as well as other rivals to his favoured material conditional account. I outline a strategy which theorists of all stripes can employ to avoid Williamson’s arguments. I then show how non-propositionalists can implement this strategy. I show how they can uphold SR when it is intuitively compelling, whilst allowing it to fail when it is not.

Other Versions

reprint Beevers, Tom (2024) "Non-propositionalism and the Suppositional Rule". Erkenntnis 89(6):2193-2214

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2022-12-12

Downloads
347 (#72,981)

6 months
143 (#30,695)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Tom Beevers
Northeastern University

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The Logic of Scientific Discovery.Karl Popper - 1959 - Studia Logica 9:262-265.
On conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 1995 - Mind 104 (414):235-329.
Vagueness.Timothy Williamson - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):589-601.

View all 19 references / Add more references