Reliabilism and deflationism

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (4):495 – 510 (2006)
Abstract
In this article I examine several issues concerning reliabilism and deflationism. I critique Alvin Goldman's account of the key differences between correspondence and deflationary theories and his claim that reliabilism can be combined only with those truth theories that maintain a commitment to truthmakers. I then consider how reliability could be analysed from a deflationary perspective and show that deflationism is compatible with reliabilism. I close with a discussion of whether a deflationary theory of knowledge is possible
Keywords Reliabilism  Deflationism  Knowledge  Truth
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DOI 10.1080/00048400601078971
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