Social Epistemology 35 (6):547-563 (2021)

Erin Beeghly
University of Utah
.Can we treat people in a discriminatory way in virtue of how we think about them? In this essay, I argue that the answer is yes. According to the constitutive claim, stereotyping constitutes discrimination, either sometimes or always. This essay defends the constitutive claim and explores the deeper justifications for it. I also sketch the constitutive claim’s larger ethical significance. One upshot is that we can wrongfully discriminate against (or in favor of) others in thought, even if we keep our views of others to ourselves. Second, if stereotyping is a form of discrimination, theories of wrongful discrimination bear on the ethical questions associated with stereotyping, including this one: under what conditions is it wrong to stereotype? In closing, I introduce an intriguing possibility, namely, that stereotyping is wrong if and when it constitutes wrongful discrimination.
Keywords Stereotyping  Discrimination  Oppression  Cognition as a Social Skill  Embodied Cognition  Epistemic Injustice
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DOI 10.1080/02691728.2021.1930274
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References found in this work BETA

Responsibility for Believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.
Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (3).
Responsibility for Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd - 2012 - Journal of Social Philosophy 43 (3):274-306.
Cognition as a Social Skill.Sally Haslanger - 2020 - Tandf: Australasian Philosophical Review 3 (1):5-25.
The Heterogeneity of Implicit Bias.Jules Holroyd & Joseph Sweetman - forthcoming - In Michael Brownstein & Jennifer Saul (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy. New York, USA: Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

(What) Are Stereotyping and Discrimination? (What) Do We Want Them to Be?Alex Madva - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 10 (11):43-51.

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