Philosophia 38 (2):265-269 (2010)
AbstractThe B-theory of time holds that McTaggart’s A-series of past, present, and future is reducible to the B-series of events running from earlier to later. According to the date-theory—originally put forth by J.J.C. Smart and later endorsed by by D.H. Mellor—the truth conditions of tensed or Asentence-tokens can be given in terms of tenseless or B-sentences and, therefore, A-sentence-tokens do not ascribe any A-determinations of pastness, presentness, or futurity. However, as Nathan Oaklander has argued, the date-theory does not provide an adequate analysis of the ontological truth conditions of irreducible A-propositions. I show that the co-reporting theory—which holds that for every A-sentence-token there is a B-sentence that differs in sense but reports the same event or state of affairs—escapes the objections Oaklander has addressed against the date-theory.
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Citations of this work
Advanced Temporalising.Daniel Deasy - 2021 - In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol.12. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
B-Theory Old and New: On Ontological Commitment.Daniel M. Johnson - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3953-3970.