Ethics 128 (3):612-625 (2018)

David Beglin
University of California, Berkeley
Here, I put forth a construal of P. F. Strawson’s so-called reversal, his view that what it means to be morally responsible is determined by our practices of holding responsible. The “concern-based” construal that I defend holds that what it means to be morally responsible is determined by the basic social concerns of which our practices are an expression. This construal, I argue, avoids a dilemma that Patrick Todd has recently raised for the reversal.
Keywords Value Theory  P.F. Strawson  Freedom and Resentment  Responsibility  Strawsonian Reversal  Free Will  Determinism  Compatibilism  Incompatibilism
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DOI 10.1086/695990
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A Puzzle Concerning Gratitude and Accountability.Robert H. Wallace - 2022 - The Journal of Ethics (Online First):1-26.

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