Southern Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):159-188 (2005)

Authors
Kathy Behrendt
Wilfrid Laurier University
Abstract
How does the concept of a person affect our beliefs about ourselves and the world? In an intriguing recent addition to his established Reductionist view of personal identity, Derek Parfit speculates that there could be beings who do not possess the concept of a person. Where we talk and think about persons, selves, subjects, or agents, they talk and think about sequences of thoughts and experiences related to a particular brain and body. Nevertheless their knowledge and experience of the world is unaffected, in that it is largely like our own. It is their view of ‘themselves’ that is different (and superior) to ours. My paper critically assesses this ‘impersonal beings’ hypothesis through an examination of Parfit’s construal of the concept of a person. I argue that Parfit’s understanding of the concept of a person undermines his impersonal beings hypothesis.
Keywords personal identity  reductionism  cocept of "  person"  Derek Parfit  impersonal beings  self
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s) 0038-4283
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2005.tb01949.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,077
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Sameness and Substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Harvard University Press.

View all 28 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Medical Ethics, Ordinary Concepts and Ordinary Lives.Elvio Baccarini - 2009 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):317-329.
An Impersonal Theory of Personal Identity.Baruch Brody - 1974 - Philosophical Studies 26 (5-6):313 - 329.
Corrupting the Youth: A History of Philosophy in Australia.Frank Jackson - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):652 – 653.
Distinctiveness of the Unseen: Buddhist Identity.Sarunya PRASOPCHINGCHANA & Dana SUGU - 2009 - International Journal on Humanistic Ideology 2 (2):115-145.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
79 ( #137,383 of 2,454,537 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #449,188 of 2,454,537 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes