Appearance of Faultless Disagreement

Dialogue 49 (4):603-616 (2010)
Abstract
A common argument for relativism invokes the appearance of faultless disagreement. I contend that the appearance is possible only under conditions that disqualify it as evidence: gross ignorance or irrationality, or else a prior commitment to an especially crude and implausible form of relativism
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DOI 10.1017/S0012217310000727
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