Philosophy in the Contemporary World 9 (1):11-18 (2002)
In several recent pieces, Daniel Dennett has advanced a line of reasoning purporting to show that we should reject the idea that there is a tenable distinction to be drawn between the manner in which we represent the way things are and the manner in which "blessedly simple" intentional systems like thermostats and frogs represent the way things are. Through a series of thought experiments, Dennett aims to show that philosophers of mind should abandon their preoccupation with "real meaning as opposed to ersatz meaning, 'intrinsic' or 'original ' intentionality as opposed to derived intentionality. " In this paper, I lay out the case that Dennett builds against original intentionality, with the aim of showing that, once it has been properly clarified, the notion of original intentionality isn't nearly the myth that Dennett makes it out to be
|Keywords||Epistemology Meaning Myth Dennett, D|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Symmetry Between the Intentionality of Minds and Machines? The Biological Plausibility of Dennett's Position.Bence Nanay - 2006 - Minds and Machines 16 (1):57-71.
Representationalism and Indeterminate Perceptual Content.John Dilworth - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (3):369-387.
Similar books and articles
On the Evolution of Intentionality as Seen From the Intentional Stance.Jeffrey E. Foss - 1994 - Inquiry 37 (3):287-310.
Meaning Rationalism, a Priori, and Transparency of Content.Tadeusz Szubka - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (4):491-503.
Real Patterns and Real Problems: Making Dennett Respectable on Patterns and Beliefs.William S. Wilkerson - 1997 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):557-70.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads185 ( #23,906 of 2,163,974 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #129,103 of 2,163,974 )
How can I increase my downloads?