Doxastic Determinism

Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 33:5-12 (2008)
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Abstract

Hard determinism is hardly a new position, but the most common arguments are not widely convincing. Theological arguments rest on the oversight or control of a supernatural entity, and so are not convincing to any who do not share the metaphysical assumptions latent in the argument. Psychological arguments reston putatively scientific claims that, if examined more closely, seem not to be scientific at all. A doxastic argument avoids these pitfalls. According to this doxastic argument, beliefs are not freely chosen, for to believe X is to be convinced of X, and it is not up to the agent to find something convincing or unconvincing. If an agent's allegedly free actions are based on beliefs, and if those beliefs cannot freely be chosen by the agent, then that agent's actions are not ultimately free.

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Steve Bein
University of Dayton

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