Philosophia 42 (2):289-307 (2014)

Delia Belleri
University of Lisbon
In this paper, I will trace a distinction between two different ways of thinking about doxastic conflicts. The first way emphasises what is going on at the level of semantics, when two subjects disagree by uttering certain sentences or accepting certain contents. The second way emphasises some aspects that are epistemic in kind, which concern what subjects are rationally required to do whenever they disagree with someone. The semantics-oriented and epistemically-oriented notions will serve for the purpose of assessing some aspects of the debate that revolves around the notions of disagreement on matters of inclination. These aspects include: (i) the idea that disagreements in areas of inclination are somehow defective (Egan 2010); (ii) the idea that Relativism makes disagreement epistemically insignificant (Carter 2013); (iii) the idea that there can be faultless disagreements in which faultlessness is epistemic in kind (Schafer 2011)
Keywords Disagreement  Relativism  Predicates of taste  Epistemology of disagreement  Faultless disagreement
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DOI 10.1007/s11406-013-9498-2
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References found in this work BETA

Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Harvard University Press.
The Nature of Normativity.Ralph Wedgwood - 2007 - Oxford University Press.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Puzzle About Disputes and Disagreements.Hans Rott - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):167–189.
Minimal Disagreement.Dan Zeman - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1649-1670.

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