Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):449-472 (2011)

Macalester Bell
Bryn Mawr College
Some attitudes typically take whole persons as their objects. Shame, contempt, disgust and admiration have this feature, as do many tokens of love and hate. Objectors complain that these ‘globalist attitudes’ can never fit their targets and thus can never be all-things-considered appropriate. Those who dismiss all globalist attitudes in this way are misguided. The fittingness objection depends on an inaccurate view of the person-assessments at the heart of the globalist attitudes. Once we understand the nature of globalist attitudes and we recognize that we may legitimately treat some traits as more important than others in our overall evaluation of persons, we ought to conclude that our globalist attitudes can, in some cases, fit their targets and should not be summarily dismissed as unfitting. Our relationships contour the fittingness-conditions of globalist attitudes. This relational element poses a problem for fitting-attitude theories of value
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2010.684.x
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In hate we trust: The collectivization and habitualization of hatred.Thomas Szanto - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-28.
In Hate We Trust: The Collectivization and Habitualization of Hatred.Thomas Szanto - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 19 (3):453-480.

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