Gupta's rule of revision theory of truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116 (1982)

Abstract

Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff and Kripke in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox, and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to.

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Author's Profile

Nuel Belnap
University of Pittsburgh

References found in this work

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125.
On Representing ‘True-in-L’ in L.Robert L. Martin - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):213-217.
Inheritors and Paradox.Dorothy Grover - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (10):590-604.
Truth: Do We Need It? [REVIEW]Dorothy L. Grover - 1981 - Philosophia (Misc.) 40 (1):225-252.

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Citations of this work

Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
The Truth is Never Simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
How Truthlike Can a Predicate Be? A Negative Result.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (4):399 - 410.
Four Valued Semantics and the Liar.Albert Visser - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):181 - 212.
Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (3):523-551.

View all 49 citations / Add more citations

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