Gupta's rule of revision theory of truth

Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116 (1982)
Authors
Nuel Belnap
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff and Kripke in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox, and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to.
Keywords truth   paradox   revision theory
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DOI 10.1007/BF00302340
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References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul A. Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125.
Inheritors and Paradox.Dorothy Grover - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (10):590-604.
Truth: Do We Need It? [REVIEW]Dorothy Grover - 1981 - Philosophia (Misc.) 40 (1):225-252.

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Citations of this work BETA

Revision Without Revision Sequences: Self-Referential Truth.Edoardo Rivello - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Logic:1-29.
Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
Contraction and Revision.Shawn Standefer - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Logic 13 (3):58-77.
Solovay-Type Theorems for Circular Definitions.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):467-487.
On Artifacts and Truth-Preservation.Shawn Standefer - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Logic 12 (3):135-158.

View all 26 citations / Add more citations

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Presentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox. [REVIEW]Nuel Belnap - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705–712.

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