Journal of Philosophical Logic 11 (1):103-116 (1982)

Authors
Nuel Belnap
University of Pittsburgh
Abstract
Gupta’s Rule of Revision theory of truth builds on insights to be found in Martin and Woodruff and Kripke in order to permanently deepen our understanding of truth, of paradox, and of how we work our language while our language is working us. His concept of a predicate deriving its meaning by way of a Rule of Revision ought to impact significantly on the philosophy of language. Still, fortunately, he has left me something to.
Keywords truth   paradox   revision theory
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DOI 10.1007/BF00302340
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References found in this work BETA

Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
A Prosentential Theory of Truth.Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125.
On Representing ‘True-in-L’ in L.Robert L. Martin - 1975 - Philosophia 5 (3):213-217.
Inheritors and Paradox.Dorothy Grover - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (10):590-604.
Truth: Do We Need It? [REVIEW]Dorothy L. Grover - 1981 - Philosophia (Misc.) 40 (1):225-252.

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Citations of this work BETA

Conditionals in Theories of Truth.Anil Gupta & Shawn Standefer - 2017 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 46 (1):27-63.
The Truth is Never Simple.John P. Burgess - 1986 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 51 (3):663-681.
How Truthlike Can a Predicate Be? A Negative Result.Vann McGee - 1985 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (4):399 - 410.
Guest Editors’ Introduction.Riccardo Bruni & Shawn Standefer - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1):1-9.
Four Valued Semantics and the Liar.Albert Visser - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):181 - 212.

View all 47 citations / Add more citations

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