Legal proof and fact finders' beliefs

Legal Theory 12 (4):293-314 (2006)
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Abstract

In procedural-law scholarship as well as in the theoretical analysis of the notion of proof as a result of the joint assessment of all items of evidence introduced in a trial, reference is frequently made to notions such as the conviction, belief, or certainty of a judge or a jury member about what happened. All these notions underscore the mental states involved in the process of determining the facts on the part of a judge or a jury. In this analysis, I look at the links between beliefs and the justification in the findings of fact provided by the judge or jury in her or its verdict

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References found in this work

Frege on Demonstratives.John Perry - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (4):474-497.
Belief and the Will.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (5):235-256.
Inquiry.Jon Barwise - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (3):429.

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